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This paper examines the causes of the observed increase in the average unemployment
duration over the past thirty years. First we analyze if changes in the demographic com-
position of the U.S. labor force can explain this increase. In particular, we examine how
much of the observed change can be explained by the change in age and gender compo-
sition. We then consider institutional changes, such as the change in the generosity and
coverage of unemployment insurance. Changes in the composition of the labor force and
institutional changes can only partially account for the observed increase in the duration
of unemployment. We construct a job search model and calibrate it to the U.S. data.
The results indicate that more than 70% of the increase in the duration of unemployment
over the last thirty years can be explained by an increase in within-group wage inequality.
Keywords: Unemployment Duration, Demographic Change, Within-Group Wage In-
equality, Job Search Model
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Figure 1: Unemployment Rate (Left Scale) and Average Unemployment Duration (Right
Scale).
Data Source: Current Population Survey
1 Introduction
It is commonly observed that unemployment duration moves together with the unemploy-
ment rate. Recent data show that this relationship is changing. Figure 1 shows the U.S.
unemployment rate (left scale) and average unemployment duration (right scale) between
1948 and 2003.1 We can observe a clear discrepancy between the two in recent years.
This tendency is more apparent when we compare the trends of these two series. Figure
2 compares the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) trend of the two series.2 Casual observation of Figure
1The data in this paper are taken from Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) website, www.bls.gov, except
where noted otherwise.















































































Figure 2: Trends of Unemployment Rate (Left Scale) and Average Unemployment Duration
(Right Scale).
Data Source: Current Population Survey
2 suggests that the di®erence of the trend has been particularly pronounced in recent years.
There has been a dramatic decline in the U.S. unemployment rate during the past twenty
years. The average duration of unemployment, however, remained high during the 1990s.
In higher frequency however, the two series seem to have maintained a stable relationship
(Baker, 1992). Figure 3 shows the HP-detrended series. The two series are moving together,
even in recent years.
There are other studies that document the increase in the average duration of unem-
ployment. Baumol and Wol® (1998), Valletta (1998), Abraham and Shimer (2001), Juhn,
Murphy, and Topel (1991, 2002) also point out that unemployment duration is becoming










































































Figure 3: Detrended Unemployment Rate (Left Scale) and Average Unemployment Duration
(Right Scale).
Data Source: Current Population Survey
Valletta (1998) examines how the incidence and duration of unemployment changed dur-
ing 1967-1998 and shows that there is an upward trend in the duration of unemployment.
He argues that rising incidence and duration of permanent job loss can account for most
of the increase in the duration of unemployment. His study does not explicitly analyze the
underlying economic reasons of this phenomenon. He speculates that a rapid technological
change, changing job search strategies, and measurement issues can be possible explanations.
Abraham and Shimer (2001) focus on the changes in the measurement of unemployment
duration and demographic changes as the sources of the observed increase in the duration.
They ¯nd that the redesign of the Current Population Survey (CPS) in 1994 explains a half a
week increase in the duration. They then examine two important demographic changes in the
4composition of the U.S. labor force which are likely to increase the duration of unemployment:
the aging of the baby-boom cohort and the increase in women's labor-force attachment. They
conclude that the ¯rst factor explains a half week increase in the duration. Therefore, in
total, a one week increase can be attributed to the measurement issues and aging of the
baby boom cohort. They attribute the remainder of the increase to the increase in women's
unemployment duration.
There is no doubt that the increase in women's labor force attachment explains a part of
the increase in the average duration. However, provided that a signi¯cant increase in average
duration can be observed in the samples that consist of only males, a substantial amount of
the increase in duration remains unexplained. For example, Juhn, Murphy, and Topel (1991,
2002) point out that for the samples of prime-aged men, unemployment duration is becoming
longer in recent years (see Figure 3 in their 1991 paper and Figure 11 in their 2002 paper).
We investigate the economic reason of this phenomenon. In particular, we construct
a search model of unemployment and examine the e®ect of the change in the economic
environment on the worker's search activity. By evaluating the model quantitatively, we
show that an increase in the dispersion of wages can have a large e®ect on the search length
of an unemployed worker. Therefore, the observed recent increase in the wage dispersion can
be a main economic force increasing the unemployment duration.
Juhn, Murphy, and Topel (1991) emphasize the labor-supply response to the change in
the wage level. Their work can be considered as complementary to ours, which emphasize
the change in wage dispersion. In her comments to Juhn, Murphy, and Topel (1991), Yellen
(1991) argues that
When there is wage dispersion, so that both good and bad jobs are available
for workers with given skills, some workers will choose to remain unemployed,
searching for good, rent-paying jobs, rather than work at the poor jobs that
are readily available... The long-term unemployed are searching for work for
which they are quali¯ed. In this interpretation, unemployment is a response to
5wage dispersion rather than to wage levels, contrary to the authors' labor supply
function, in which labor supply depends only on wage levels. (pp. 129{130)
Our hypothesis parallels her argument | the recent change in wage distribution may have
had a signi¯cant impact on the duration of unemployment.
Baumol and Wol® (1998) argue that technological progress can explain the increase in
the duration of unemployment. When technological progress is more rapid, the relative cost
of hiring a worker whose training cost is higher (e.g. unskilled and/or old workers) increases.
As a consequence, the supply of jobs available to these workers decreases, thereby increasing
their duration of job search.
Our theory does not rule out technological change as a main cause of the longer un-
employment duration. In fact, Violante (2002) shows that the recent increase in embodied
technological progress can explain a large part of the rise in wage dispersion which is not
explained by worker characteristics. Our theory, combined with Violante's story, can provide
another channel through which technological progress can a®ect the duration of unemploy-
ment.
In the next section, we brie°y examine the time-series properties of average unemployment
duration. In Section 3, we examine if demographic change is responsible for the increase in
the duration of unemployment. In Section 4, we discuss if institutional change can explain
the change in unemployment duration. In Section 5, we present our model and analyze it
quantitatively. Section 6 concludes.
2 Time-Series Properties
Before exploring possible explanations for the change in unemployment duration, we examine
some time-series properties of the data. Let Dt be the average unemployment duration at
year t. For the whole sample period (t = 1948 to 2003), the average of Dt is 13.2 weeks.
From Figure 1, we clearly observe an increase in average Dt. To identify the timing of the





































































Figure 4: W Statistic.
of the whole sample as m ´ [
P2003
t=1948 Dt]=T. The sample size, T, is 56. Let S be the sum of
the square mean-deviation : S ´
P2003
t=1948(Dt ¡ m)2.
Here, we would like to identify the timing of the increase in average Dt. To achieve
this, we divide the sample period into two di®erent subperiods. We denote the break point
by ¿. Then, we calculate the mean of the ¯rst subperiod m1 ´ [
P¿
t=1948 Dt]=T1. Here,
the sample size T1 = ¿ ¡ 1948 + 1. Let S1 be the sum of the square mean-deviation:
S1 ´
P¿
t=1948(Dt ¡ m1)2. Similarly, for the second subperiod, m2 ´ [
P2003
t=¿+1 Dt]=T2, where
T2 = 2003 ¡ ¿. Let S2 be the sum of the square mean-deviation: S2 ´
P2003
t=¿ (Dt ¡ m2)2.
We calculate a Wald-type statistic, W ´ T(S ¡S1 ¡S2)=(S1 +S2), for each ¿. Following
convention (Maddala and Kim 1998, p.395), we consider ¿ = 1956;:::;1995 (disregarding the
¯rst 15% and the last 15%). A large value of this statistic indicates a structural change.
Figure 4 plots the series of W. The value of W exceeds 25 between 1972 and 1982.3 It
seems likely that structural change occurred during this period. W reaches its maximum at
3The asymptotic critical value for 1% signi¯cance (against the null hypothesis of no structural change
during the period) is 12.35 (Andrews 1993, Table 1).
71980.4 The average of Dt for t = 1948;:::;1980 (m1) is 11.5 weeks, while the average of Dt for
t = 1981;:::;2003 (m2) is 15.5 weeks. Therefore, the di®erence before and after the change
(m2 ¡ m1) when ¿ = 1980 is 4.0 weeks. When we select a ¿ from the period between 1972
and 1982, the di®erence in average duration, m2 ¡ m1, takes a value between 3.4 weeks to
4.0 weeks. In the next section, we explore whether various explanations can account for this
magnitude of increase in average unemployment duration.
3 Demographic Adjustment
In this section, we examine if the change in demographic composition can account for the
recent increase in average unemployment duration. In particular, we focus on the composition
in age and gender.
First we divide the unemployed people into two gender groups: men and women. Then
each group is divided into seven age groups: Am = f men 16-19, men 20-24, men 25-34,
men 35-44, men 45-54, men 55-64, men 65+ g and Aw = f women 16-19, women 20-24,
women 25-34, women 35-44, women 45-54, women 55-64, women 65+ g.5 Therefore, we have
fourteen demographic groups. Let ft(i) be the fraction of unemployed workers who are in
group i at time t, and let Dt(i) be the average duration of unemployment for workers who






Equation (1) implies that if the fraction of the group who experiences longer unemployment
spells increases, then the average unemployment duration increases.
Table 1 shows that in general, older workers experience a substantially longer unemploy-
ment duration than younger workers (except for the 65+ age group). It also shows that
women's duration tends to be shorter than men's (except for the 25-34 age group). Figure
4When we specify the process of Dt as an AR(1) process, the W statistic calculated from the residuals
reaches its peak at 1982.
5These age categories coincide with the age groups used by the BLS.
816-19 20-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+
Men 12.0 16.7 17.9 22.5 24.8 26.8 24.8
Women 11.2 15.1 18.0 20.3 23.2 25.2 21.3
Table 1: Average Duration of Unemployment for Each Demographic Group (Weeks, Year
2003)
Data Source: Current Population Survey
5 shows the average age of unemployed workers from 1948-2003.6 Since the 1970s, there has
been some increase in the average age, mainly due to the aging of the baby-boom cohort.
Figure 6 shows the fraction of women in the unemployment pool. Here we observe some
increase over time. In the following, we explore the e®ect of demographic changes on the
duration of unemployment.
We consider two thought-experiments. The ¯rst is \What if the people in each group
behaved the same but the demographics (the composition of the population) changed as in
reality?" Second, \What if the demographics (the composition of the population) remained
the same but the people in each group changed their behavior as in reality?" The ¯rst
experiment captures the e®ect of the change in composition of the population, and the
second experiment captures the e®ect of people's changing behavior.
3.1 First Experiment | Pure Composition E®ect
We compute how much the unemployment duration has increased because of the demographic






For robustness, we examine two di®erent base years (t0): 1967 and 2003.
Figure 7 shows Dd
t1;t0 for t0 = 1967 and t0 = 2003. Neither of the series have an apparent
trend. In fact, if we calculate the average of Dd
t1;t0 before 1980 and after 1981, there is a
6This ¯gure is computed by assigning the middle value to each group and taking weighted sum. We
assigned 70 to the 65+ group.

































































Figure 5: Average Age of Unemployed Workers
slight decline. Even when we take the di®erence between the smallest Dd
t1;t0 (t1 = 1972 or
1973) and the largest Dd
t1;t0 in recent years (t1 = 2003), it is less than two weeks, which is
much smaller than the observed increase in Section 2.
To see the e®ect of the adjustment more clearly, we subtract Dd
t1;t0 (with t0 = 2003) from
the trend of average duration (shown in Figure 2). Figure 8 shows this series. The structural
change is even more apparent than in previous ¯gures { there is a clear shift in the mean
between the late 1970s and the early 1980s.
3.2 Second Experiment | Changing Behavior
Next, we compute how much of the increase in the duration of unemployment would have


























































Figure 6: The Fraction (%) of Women in Unemployment Pool
duration) measures the change in average duration that is not accounted for by the demo-
graphic change. Here, we hypothetically assume that demographics remained the same from
period t0 to t1, and that the duration of unemployment for each group (Dt(i)) followed the







Figure 9 shows D
g
t1;t0 for t0 = 1967 and t0 = 2003.8 They both show a very similar trend
to Figure 1. In fact, the di®erences between the average before 1980 and after 1981 are 3.4
weeks (t0 = 1967) and 3.9 weeks (t0 = 2003). These are slightly smaller than the value in
Section 2, but still substantial.





























































base year = 1967
base year = 2003
Figure 7: Dd
t1;t0 for t0 = 1967 and t0 = 2003
4 Institutional Change
An alternative candidate for an explanation is that this increase in unemployment dura-
tion might have been caused by the change in institutions. In fact, there have been some
changes in the unemployment insurance system during the post-war period. Theoretically,
if unemployment insurance became more generous, it may have an e®ect which lengthens
the duration of unemployment. Baicker, Goldin, and Katz (1997) describe the changes of
the unemployment insurance system since the 1930s. Although there have been increases in
coverage in the 1970s (mainly including public sector workers), they argue that the generosity
of the unemployment insurance has remained almost constant, and that the ratio of unem-
ployment insurance claims to total unemployment has been declining during the post-war


































































Figure 8: The deviation of actual average duration (HP trend) from Dd
t1;t0 (t0 = 2003).
insured unemployment rate has been stable throughout the 1950s to the 1970s.9 Therefore,
change in the unemployment insurance system is not likely to be an explanation for the
longer unemployment duration.10 Baumol and Wol® (1998) also support this view. They ex-
amine the e®ect of institutional changes on the duration of unemployment and conclude that
institutional factors like changes in the coverage and generosity of unemployment insurance,
changes in the rate of unionization, and changes in the minimum wage cannot account for
the observed increase in the duration of unemployment.
9Baumol and Wol® (1998) report that the insured coverage rate (the percent of unemployed workers
receiving bene¯ts) has been dropping if the data is extended until 1990s.
10Ehrenberg and Oaxaca (1976) estimate that moving from a welfare system without an unemployment
insurance to a system similar to the U.S. unemployment insurance system increases the duration of unem-
ployment by one week for old (age 45-59) male, and by less than one week for the other demographic groups.














































base year = 1967
base year = 2003
Figure 9: D
g
t1;t0 for t0 = 1967 and t0 = 2003
5 Model
In Sections 3 and 4 we explored if demographic changes and institutional changes can account
for the observed increase in average unemployment duration. Both of these factors, however,
have not had a large enough e®ect to drive the larger change in average duration. In this
section, we construct a search model and investigate several possible explanations.
5.1 Setup
We employ a variant of the search model by McCall (1970). Consider a worker who is
unemployed and searching for a job. We assume that there is no borrowing or saving, and
that the period utility for an unemployed worker is us. For an employed worker receiving
wage w, the momentary utility is ue(w) ´ ln(w).
14An unemployed worker receives one wage o®er each period. He decides whether or not to
accept it. Once he accepts, he will work at that wage until he is separated from the job. If
he rejects, the search continues in the subsequent period. The separation occurs exogenously
at the probability ® 2 [0;1) every period. After the separation, the worker is unemployed
for at least one period.
We assume that the wage o®er is independently and identically distributed, and follows
a lognormal distribution
ln(w) » N(m ¡ ¾2=2;¾2):
Therefore,
E[w] = em and V ar[w] = e2m(e¾2
¡ 1):

















where F(¢) is the distribution function of the wage o®er.
This problem has a simple reservation-wage property: the worker accepts the wage o®er
if w is above the reservation wage, and rejects if it is below the reservation wage. The
reservation wage ¹ w solves (derivation is in the Appendix)
ue( ¹ w) ¡ us =
¯




ue(w0) ¡ ue( ¹ w)
¤
dF(w0): (5)
Let ¸ ´ F( ¹ w) be the probability that an unemployed worker is still unemployed next period.
5.2 Calibration
Equation (5) is scale-free in the sense that if m is replaced by m + ¹ and us is replaced
by us + ¹, the reservation wage ¹ w will become ¹ w ¢ e¹ and ¸ remains the same. Therefore,
we can normalize m. Here, we set m = 0. We set one month as one period. Therefore,
¯ = 0:9471=12.11
11The value for the annual discount rate ¯ is taken from Cooley and Prescott (1995).
15In the following sections, we conduct two comparative statics to evaluate how the change
in parameters a®ects the duration of unemployment. There have been two dramatic changes
in the labor market in recent years:
1. Change in the incidence of unemployment.
2. Change in the dispersion of wages.
Here, as a benchmark, we set the parameters so that the model matches the data before
1970. As is examined in the next section, the incidence of unemployment (the probability of
becoming unemployed during each month) was stable around 0.025 before 1970. Therefore,
we set ® = 0:025.
The other parameters, us and ¾, are set so that the following two conditions are satis¯ed.
1. The average duration of unemployment, 1=(1 ¡ ¸), is approximately 2.5 (10 weeks).
2. The 90% ¡ 10% log wage di®erence of employed workers is 0:9 (From Katz and Autor
1999, Figure 5d).
These two conditions provide us = ¡6:2 and ¾ = 0:65. Note that when we compute the
90% ¡ 10% log wage di®erence, we only look at the accepted wage o®ers (which can be
observed in the data).
5.3 Change in the Incidence of Unemployment
The dynamics of the unemployment rate ut is governed by
ut+1 = ®(1 ¡ ut) + ¸ut;
where the ¯rst term in the right-hand-side is the number of workers separated at time t, and
the second term in the right-hand-side is the number of workers who are unemployed at time
t and rejected the time-t job o®er (as before, ¸ is de¯ned as ¸ ´ F( ¹ w)). In steady-state, ut
is constant (call it ¹ u), and
¹ u =
®


































































Figure 10: Incidence of unemployment
As is apparent from (6), ¹ u is increasing in both ® and ¸. When ¸ increases (longer duration),
¹ u goes down only if ® decreases by a su±cient amount.
Indeed, this can be seen in the data. Figure 10 plots the incidence of unemployment (the
number of the workers unemployed less than ¯ve weeks divided by the total employment)
using monthly BLS series. The thick line depicts the HP-trend.12 Before 1970, the incidence
was stable around 0.025. It went up to 0.035 in the 1980s, and then went down to 0.020 in the
1990s. The very small value in recent years re°ects the coexistence of a low unemployment
rate and a long unemployment duration.13
12We use ¸ = 129600 for monthly data following Ravn and Uhlig (2002).
13In fact, Juhn, Murphy, and Topel (2002) argue that the decrease in the unemployment rate observed
in the 1990s is driven almost entirely by the decreased incidence of unemployment. Even though the dura-
tion of unemployment remained as high as its level in the 1980s, the lower rate of separation dragged the
unemployment rate down to very low levels.
17® ¹ w Avg. Duration
0.020 1.04 11.4 weeks
0.025 0.96 10.0 weeks
0.030 0.90 9.2 weeks
0.035 0.84 8.4 weeks
Table 2: E®ect of Change in ®
In the following, we conduct comparative statics by comparing the model outcome in
steady-states. Focusing on the steady-state simpli¯es our calculation, and considering that
we analyze a long-run trend which is much longer than the unemployment spells (average 10
weeks), we belive that it provides a fairly good approximation.
Qualitatively, it is clear from (5) that ¹ w is decreasing in ®, so a higher ® leads to a
shorter duration. The intuition is that a worker becomes less selective to the job when the
probability that the job will be terminated is high. Quantitatively, Table 2 summarizes the
average duration of unemployment for di®erent values of ®. The di®erence between ® = 0:025
(before the 1970s14) and ® = 0:020 (recent years) is 1.4 weeks, which is smaller than half
of the change in unemployment duration that we identi¯ed in Section 2 (3.4 weeks to 4.0
weeks). Moreover, in the 1980s the duration was long even though ® was large. This deepens
the puzzle. In the next section, we turn to the next possible factor.
5.4 Change in the Dispersion of Wages
Many labor economists have observed that there are substantial wage di®erentials for obser-
vationally equivalent workers. Mincer-style wage equations typically explain less than 30% of
the overall wage variation. The remaining variation, which is more than 70%, is often called
within-group (or residual) wage inequality.
There is a large body of theoretical literature which attempts to explain the existence
of wage dispersion among workers of the same characteristics. The most popular approach
14This value is the average for 1948-1979. If we take the average for 1948-1970, the value is somewhat lower
at ® = 0:024.
18is to utilize a model of search and matching in a frictional labor market (see, for example,
Burdett and Mortensen 1998). In the following analysis, we do not attempt to explain the
source of the within-group wage inequality. Instead, we take the wage dispersion as given for
the workers.
Beginning with Katz and Murphy (1992) and Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993), re-
searchers have noticed that there has been a signi¯cant increase in within-group wage in-
equality during recent years. Some recent studies investigate the causes of this increase in
within-group wage inequality. For example, Violante (2002) argues that the rapid investment-
speci¯c technological change in recent years is the major cause of the increase in within-group
wage inequality. In our model, we take this increase in within-group wage inequality as given,
and analyze how this increase can change the behavior of the workers who are searching for
a job.
Here we evaluate the impact of an increase in ¾. Katz and Autor (1999, Figure 5d) show
that male within-group wage inequality increased from 0.9 to 1.2 over the past 30 years.
Thus, we set a new value of ¾, so that the 90% ¡ 10% log wage di®erence is 1:2.
It is well known that in McCall-style search models, a mean-preserving spread in the wage
o®er distribution increases the reservation wage. An unemployed worker tends to wait longer
since the option value of a job opportunity (opportunity cost of accepting a job) increases
with the variance of the wage o®er. When the variance increases, the possibility of receiving
a very low wage and very high wage both increase. An increase in the probability of a very
low-wage o®er does not a®ect the value of waiting, since those o®ers are always rejected
anyway. Higher probability of a very high-wage o®er, however, increases the value of waiting
since those are the o®ers that are accepted and a®ect the worker's welfare. Therefore, the
increase in variance makes the job opportunity better.
Table 3 summarizes how ¹ w and the average duration change when ¾ changes. When ¾
changes from 0:65 to 0:93 so that the 90%¡10% log wage di®erence matches the data (0.9 and
1.2, respectively), ¹ w increases from 0.96 to 1.02 and the average duration of unemployment
1990% ¡ 10% log wage di®erence ¾ ¹ w Avg. Duration
0.9 0.65 0.96 10.0 weeks
1.0 0.75 0.99 11.1 weeks
1.1 0.84 1.01 12.0 weeks
1.2 0.93 1.02 12.8 weeks
Table 3: E®ect of Change in ¾
increases by 2.8 weeks.15 This value is between 70% to 82% of the amount of increase in
data.16 Here we are keeping the value of ® = 0:025. When we include the e®ect of the change
in ® by changing to ® = 0:02, this model \over-explains" the data | the average duration
becomes 4.8 weeks longer.17 Considering that all of the increase in the within-group wage
inequality may not correspond to the increase in dispersion of wage o®er, it is reasonable to
think that these two factors explain a large part (but perhaps not all) of the increase in the
average duration.
To see the robustness of the result, we carried out the same experiment for di®erent period
lengths (which coincides with the frequency of the wage o®ers). The calibrated values of us,
¾ (when the log wage di®erence is 0:9), and ¾0 (when the log wage di®erence is 1:2) are shown
in Table 4. (¯ and ® are adjusted as the period length changes.) Table 4 also shows the
reservation wages under ¾ (denoted as ¹ w), the reservation wages under ¾0 (denoted as ¹ w0),
and the increase in the unemployment duration. We consistently observe an increase in the
unemployment duration of more than two weeks. In each case, the impact of increasing wage
inequality is quantitatively substantial in explaining the longer unemployment duration.
Not all the within-group wage inequality may be the pure \luck" factor (good or bad
wage draw in the model) from the viewpoint of the workers. It is possible that some part of
the within-group wage inequality is due to the unobservable characteristics of the workers,
15Also, in this model, higher ¹ w implies a larger dispersion in the unemployment duration, since the coe±cient
of variation in the search length is ¸
1=2.
16In Section 2, we estimated the increase to be between 3.4 weeks and 4.0 weeks. The above numbers follow
since (2:8=4:0) £ 100 = 70% and (2:8=3:4) £ 100 = 82%.
17In this case, ¾ changes to 0.98 to match the 90% ¡ 10% log wage di®erence of 1.2.
20Period Length us ¾ ¾0 ¹ w ¹ w0 Increase in Duration
2 weeks -5.6 0.79 1.10 1.42 1.57 1.9 weeks
4 weeks -6.2 0.65 0.93 0.96 1.02 2.8 weeks
6 weeks -7.0 0.55 0.81 0.75 0.76 2.7 weeks
Table 4: Results for Di®erent Period Lengths
which is known by the workers but not by the econometricians. Gottschalk and Mo±tt
(1994, Table 2) show that during their sample period (both subperiods of 1970-78 and 1979-
87), the permanent component explains 2/3 of the log-wage dispersion, and the temporary
component accounts for 1/3. Their permanent component estimate includes the returns to
education, so it is a plausible estimate that 1/2 of the within-group inequality is transitory,
i.e. due to the \luck" factor. Therefore, we re-set the initial value of ¾ to match 90% ¡ 10%
log wage di®erence of 0.45 (which makes ¾ = 0:32 and us = ¡3:0), and see how the change
in ¾ changes the average duration of unemployment.
90% ¡ 10% log wage di®erence ¾ ¹ w Avg. Duration
0.45 0.32 1.03 10.0 weeks
0.50 0.37 1.07 11.2 weeks
0.55 0.42 1.10 12.1 weeks
0.60 0.47 1.13 12.9 weeks
Table 5: E®ect of Change in ¾
Table 5 shows the result. The change in the average duration is vary similar to Table 3.
In particular, when the 90%¡10% log wage di®erence increases from 0.45 to 0.6, the average
duration increases by 2.9 weeks.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we examined the causes of the increase in the U.S. average unemployment
duration in recent years. We showed that demographic change can account for only a small
fraction of the observed increase in the average duration of unemployment. Institutional
21change does not seem to be a major factor, either. By quantitatively evaluating a search
model, we showed that both the decrease of separation and the increase in wage dispersion
(within-group wage inequality) can make the average duration longer. The e®ect of the wage
dispersion is particularly large, and it alone accounts for 70-82% of the observed increase in
duration.
Clearly, wages and unemployment (incidence and duration) are determined simultane-
ously in the labor market. Our analysis is a ¯rst step towards a better understanding of
the interaction between them in the context of the recent U.S. economy. More detailed and
complete analysis of this interaction is an important future research agenda.
22Appendix
A Derivation of (5)
First, we establish that the solution to (4) has a reservation-wage property. The second term
of max does not depend on w. Suppose that v(¢) is a continuous and nondecreasing function.
Since limx!0 ue(x) = ¡1 and limx!1 ue(x) = 1 (and continuity), there exists at least one
value of ¹ w which satis¯es
ue( ¹ w) + ¯
½






= us + ¯
Z
v(w0)dF(w0):
With such a ¹ w, the optimal choice for the unemployed worker is to accept when w ¸ ¹ w and
to reject when w < ¹ w.
In (4), with the supposition that v(¢) is continuous and nondecreasing, the right-hand-
side is also continuous and nondecreasing. It is also straightforward to see that (4), seen
as a mapping, is a contraction mapping. Therefore, by the standard argument, it can be
established that v(¢) is in fact continuous and nondecreasing.
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Since this is equal to us + ¯
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This can be rewritten as
ue( ¹ w)
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(9)
23where the second equality used the fact that v(w) = us + ¯
R
v(w0)dF(w0) when w · ¹ w, (7),














Using this to the left-hand-side of (9), subtracting ¯
R 1
¹ w ue( ¹ w)dF(w0)=(1¡¯) from both sides,
and rearranging yields (5). Since the left-hand-side of (5) is strictly increasing in ¹ w and the
right-hand-side of (5) is nonincreasing in ¹ w, the reservation wage ¹ w is unique.
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